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When mind and body are in dispute, desire arises for stable points of 
reference like disciplinary boundaries. This paper contends that the sense of 
the integrity of a ‘body’ of thought or of a critical textual corpus is not a 
spatial-corporeal metaphor, but is an aspect of the way in which 
disciplinarity represents modes of being in the world, which, like all human 
activity, involve actualisation of the mind and body. Such actualisation is 
described here as ‘embodiment,’ which is defined as the ways in which the 
unconscious posits its exterior.  Critical theorising about mind and body must 
include an account of the relationship between ‘theorising’ mind and body 
and ‘being’ embodied. This paper makes this point by using ‘polytextual’ 
readings of texts that discuss phenomena (such as phantom limbs) which 
render problematical the intuitive understanding we have of our minds and 
bodies. 
 
 
 
‘It is no more incumbent upon science to find a soul in the body 
than to find God in the world. True, science does not tell the 
whole story. But, alas, it is a story that cannot be told except per 
speculum in aenigmate.’ 
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    Zeno Vendler, ‘The Ineffable Soul’ 
(1996, 328) 
In an episode of the popular television science series Ultrascience 
(Discovery Channel, Foxtel, 26 March 1999) results of tests to determine the 
viability of implanting silicon chips into the brain were described as 
‘surprising.’ When placed on a silicon chip, the elementary stuff of which 
brains are made (neurons) gravitated toward electronically stored information, 
as if driven by an instinctual compulsion to ‘talk to each other.’ The neurons 
behaved as though their primary instinct is not to preserve their own kind but 
to follow all paths toward complexity. Thus, they were said to demonstrate 
constructive and communicative drives, a characteristic backed up by the 
observation that isolated neurons tend simply to stop, as though they had 
‘programmed themselves to die.’ The presenter declared that such discoveries 
emerge ‘as powerful new brain technologies unlock more of the mind’s 
secrets.’ 
From a critical psychological perspective, the claims made in texts 
intended for popular consumption such as this one may seem all too easy to 
grasp as a substitute for ‘hard’ scientific research, and just as easy to dismiss 
as so much popularised hyperbole. This ‘critical psychological perspective’ 
includes arms of psychology which have developed a common interest in 
reflexively interrogating psychological practices and exploring possibilities 
for dialogue with other disciplines. As this simple definition suggests, the 
various schools of critical psychology are also characterised by a fundamental 
belief that their critical activity proceeds from a sufficiently stable point of 
reference to enable self-reflexivity, and that this point of reference is 
organised around a framework that enables demarcations between one’s own 
and ‘other’ disciplines. 
This sense of disciplinary propriety is what might ordinarily prompt 
psychologists to prick up their ears at the claims made in popular science 
texts that ‘powerful new brain technologies’ are only now unlocking the 
secrets of the mind. Such a claim obviously threatens the sensibilities of those 
who feel that the ‘secrets’ of the mind are properly the domain of the 
psychological rather than the physical sciences. Critically-minded thinkers 
may at least pause over the unquestioning conflation of the brain with the 
mind at the core of these claims, as though no measure is taken of the long-
standing debate that has come to be known as the ‘mind-body problem.’ Of 
course, it is unlikely that many psychologists would feel the need to respond 
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to a popular science program, for reasons that will probably range from a 
refusal to engage in dialogue with physical science (imagined to be equally 
stubborn in its refusal to entertain core philosophical questions) to simple 
disregard for ‘unimportant’ or ‘naive’ products of popular culture. 
The point I want to make here is that this sense of disciplinary propriety is 
what may be at stake in debates over the mind-body problem. I do not mean 
simply that these debates place disciplinary borderlines in dispute, although 
the uncertainty surrounding these boundaries provides a starting point. My 
broader argument will be that when mind and body are in dispute, in 
particular, a stark desire emerges for stable points of reference like 
disciplinary boundaries or fields of discourse among the disputants. This 
argument will be constructed upon a premise that the sense of exteriority and 
interiority, or of the integrity of a ‘body’ of thought, or of a critical textual 
corpus are not simply spatial-corporeal metaphors defining a discipline. 
Rather, they are aspects of the way in which disciplinary activity functions as 
a mode of being in the world, which, like all human activity, is linked to the 
processes actualising human minds and bodies. For the purpose of this 
argument, I shall consider these processes in toto under the blanket of a single 
term: embodiment. Although my understanding of the term shall become 
more apparent, I will define it loosely here as the ways in which the 
unconscious posits its own exterior. 
As I have indicated, the mind-body problem throws the uncertainty of the 
disciplinary boundaries of those involved in the debate into sharp relief. If 
there is an unwillingness on the part of psychologists to respond to popular 
scientific texts which oversimplify or conflate notions of mind and body, 
another reason may be that the mind-body problem has been debated in an 
increasingly closed forum, an index of the reluctance of those involved in the 
debate to broadcast the fact that they have a problem which they seem unable 
to collectively resolve. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current 
Debate, Richard Warner and Tadeusz Szubka (1996) survey the state of the 
debate, suggesting that there are too many schools of thought involved, and 
the stakes are too high, to expect that something like a unified mind-body 
theory is attainable. The editors claim that what is at stake is no longer the 
answer to the relation of mind and body, but what status to give to the 
questions we ask: what is at stake, then, is the ‘explanatory adequacy’ of any 
discourse to account for the mental. 
Several of the contributors to this collection argue that we may indeed 
never be able to account for mental or non-physical phenomena from the 
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standpoint of a discourse of the physical.1 Colin McGinn (1996), in particular, 
claims that the problem cannot be solved, yet that such insolubility is 
precisely the condition of uncertainty with which the mind is positioned in 
relation to its physical origins. Using formal propositional logic, McGinn 
demonstrates that conscious reason is inherently incapable of accounting for 
itself (qua consciousness) in regards to its physical status. Yet he concludes 
that we may only talk about the relation of mind to body in terms of 
observable physical effects, a problem for neuroscience (not philosophy). 
This conclusion follows logically from the premise with which his argument 
commences, that minds ‘are biological products like bodies’ (100). While I do 
not wish to rail against this physicalist approach, I shall pursue a parallel 
argument, based on McGinn’s own claims about the condition of uncertainty 
which surrounds the origins of consciousness. Thus, I question whether the 
corollary that consciousness has biology as its only source can be stated with 
any degree of certainty. 
In a postscript to his essay, McGinn admits that he was wrong to have 
assumed that the limits appertaining to conscious reason applied equally to all 
representational systems, and he adds that genetic coding and subconscious 
brain representations may ‘contain the kind of philosophical information 
denied to conscious reason’ (115). His aim is to wrest initiative in the mind-
body debate away from the proper domain of reason (philosophy) and situate 
it with the physical sciences (such as genetics or brain science). Yet McGinn 
realises that to satisfy demands of ‘explanatory adequacy,’ he must appeal to 
philosophy in qualifying the kinds of information that physical sciences 
should be able to extract from genes or brain matter. After all, genes or brain 
matter (neurons) are not seen as adequate in themselves to account for the 
origin of consciousness, but when we view them as systems of representation 
or codes, unconstrained by the limits of conscious reasoning, they begin to fit 
the criteria for explanatory adequacy. I argue here that we might just as 
adequately consider the unconscious as containing precisely the kind of 
philosophical information denied to conscious reason. Furthermore, as we 
shall see, investigations into unconsciousness account for the formation of 
representational systems by reckoning the condition of representation per se. 
Importantly, however, I do not pretend that this argument provides any 
kind of solution to the mind-body problem. Like McGinn, I suggest that the 
problem is insoluble, and I propose merely an alternative account of why such 
insolubility emerges inevitably from how, in everyday life as thinking social 
beings, we conduct and construct ourselves in the world. To enable discussion 
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of the relations between disciplines in these terms, I will use the concept of 
‘critical polytextualism’ developed by Rex and Wendy Stainton Rogers in 
Stories of Childhood (cited in Morss 1996, 138-41). Critical polytextualism 
refers to the ‘multiplicity of interpretations’ always in operation in any social 
or critical practice, suggesting that these multiple interpretations mark 
themselves textually as one text among others within the category of 
interpretation. 
Rather than dismiss the popular science television program on the grounds 
of ignorance, irrelevance or naiveté, I want to provide a polytextual reading to 
illustrate the utility of the concept here. To do this, I will briefly compare the 
claims made in the episode of Ultrascience with Sigmund Freud’s 
development of the concepts of eros and thanatos. This comparison provides 
a minimal and somewhat reductive example of a polytextual reading, yet this 
reduction will help to isolate the key problematic of the ‘explanatory 
adequacy’ of a discourse when this adequacy is defined in terms of the 
inadequacies of other discourses. This is not to suggest that an explanatory 
method that is self-aware about its own inadequacies is necessarily closer to 
the truth of its object than one that believes itself to be thoroughly adequate; it 
is rather to suggest that the truth we find is a product of our methods for 
finding the truth. If our method is defined (polytextually) in opposition to 
another discourse, the truths we find will be defined in the same way. By 
definition, two people looking at an object from different perspectives will 
not see the same object, and neither will see the whole of this object, yet we 
may learn more about the people than the object itself by looking closely at 
the perspectives from which each sees the object. 
In the episode of Ultrascience, tests into the viability of new brain 
technologies revealed two related types of activity from neurons: attraction to 
electronically charged inorganic matter and the inability to continue to 
function in isolation. Moving from observation to explanation, these types of 
activity are labelled ‘behaviours’ to which a particular type of motivation can 
be attributed. Attraction to electronically charged matter is described as a 
constructive, communicative impulse, a description aided by calling the 
charge ‘information.’ The inability to function in isolation is then cast as the 
negative side of this same impulse: when it is unable to ‘talk’ the neuron will 
‘die,’ as if ‘programmed’ to do so. Of course, this movement from 
observation to explanation provides the ground for the claim that these new 
brain technologies (as the instrument of observation) are unlocking secrets of 
the mind (emerging in explanation). 
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More than a century earlier, in his ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’ 
(1895), Freud posited three types of neurones (φ, ψ, and ω), corresponding to 
the functioning of the nervous system - he called these the ‘agencies’ 
[Instanzen] of the psychic apparatus in the Interpretation of Dreams (1900) - 
mediating between sensory perceptions and the treatment (cathexis) of 
internalised material. Yet even as he was finishing his ‘Project,’ Freud was 
concentrating his thoughts less on defining the types of neurons than on 
mapping the functions to which they corresponded. From Interpretation of 
Dreams onwards, he formulated his topography of the psychical apparatus: 
the conscious, pre-conscious and unconscious, subdivided by imperatives of 
the id, ego and superego, and serving competing interests of the life drive 
(eros) and death drive. 
Elizabeth Wilson (1998) provides a compelling case for reading the 
Freudian canon and its topography in a way that suggests he never altogether 
abandoned his neurological ‘Project’ (133-44). Wilson points out that in 
Freud’s model for a scientific psychology, neurons are unable to carry the 
origin of consciousness except inasmuch as they provide the agencies for the 
differences between endogenous and external excitations of Qn (quantity). 
Thus, he ‘dislodge(s) a strict biological essentialism from the neuron,’ on the 
path to critiquing neuropsychological localisation (Wilson: 143). Freud’s 
‘Project’ does not recruit the physical science of neurology in order to render 
the psyche intelligible: it inverts this trajectory ‘and uses the psyche to render 
traditional neurology intelligible’ (144). The unpublished model for a 
scientific psychology was therefore a blueprint for Freud’s metapsychology, 
in which the relation of neurology, biology or physiology to the psyche are 
viewed with ambivalence, but never fully disregarded. As a result, for 
Wilson, the ‘Project’ manifests ‘a certain dilemma (of mind and body, 
neurology and psychology) that a hundred years later is no closer to being 
addressed properly inside psychology’ (139). 
Returning momentarily to the episode of Ultrascience, I suggest that the 
way in which its conclusions are drawn can be compared with Freud’s 
theoretical investigations into the drives on at least two levels. On one level, 
the two drives that are attributed to the neurons - constructive and destructive 
- may seem uncannily similar to the primary drives around which Freud 
formulated and then revised his hypothetical topography of the psychical 
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apparatus.  On another level, these drives are identified according to the logic 
of reductive biologism: physical science is recruited in order to render the 
secrets of the mind intelligible. The popular science program uses observation 
of the brain to mark explanations of mental processes as properties of the 
object rather than as products of interpretative discourse. 
That these two discourses could mirror each other so closely with respect 
to their object (neurons) and explanations (two primary drives), yet represent 
diametrically opposed standpoints (reductive biologism versus a direct 
inversion of the same), is an example of the ‘critical polytextualism’ 
identified by the Stainton Rogers. As I have indicated, in my understanding of 
this term, polytextualism suggests not only the multiplicity of critical 
interpretations in operation in any practice but also the relativity of these 
interpretations to each other, intertextually. Contradictory interpretations of 
the same phenomenon are adequate in themselves, in so far as they are true to 
their perspective, yet no interpretation is ever fully adequate with respect to 
the phenomena they purport to explain. Such inadequacy arises not simply 
from the status of representations of things, but also from the degree to which 
representations (as texts) refer to other texts. Understanding the 
polytextualism of a critical text enables us to consider its relation to the 
broader body of texts - its corpus (a deliberate metaphor, to which I will 
return) - to which it belongs. For the Stainton Rogers, such consideration 
leads to further and more elaborate explanations by taking measure of the 
range of interpretations available. What thus emerges from an understanding 
of critical polytextualism is not a replacement of one inadequate explanation 
with a more complex explanation that is better only in so far as it is aware of 
its inadequacy; rather, in the words of John Morss (1996), it is the rejection of 
all pretensions to realism which makes this approach ‘closer to literary styles 
of analysis such as deconstruction’ (141). 
This suggestion is not intended to unduly privilege literary styles of 
analysis over other interpretative practices. Rather, it is intended to highlight 
the problems confronting the disputants in the debate over mind and body, 
given the need to present their arguments textually - that is, to engage with 
the polytext produced by the discourses in dispute - and to produce a corpus 
or body of texts of one’s own. For this reason, I have been quite deliberate in 
my choice of texts for use in the first example of this mode of reading: two 
discourses which may seem in some degree irrelevant to the debate proper, 
yet which provide extremely strong positions (in opposition) on the concepts 
of mind and body. 
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What I want to do now is open this minimal polytextual reading out by 
introducing the concept of embodiment, which I have already defined loosely 
as the ways in which the unconscious posits its own exterior. I am aware that 
this is not a definition of the term with which many will have immediate 
agreement. Yet it strikes me that the reason for this may be that there have 
been few attempts to actually produce a clear definition of embodiment in 
spite of the fact that issues of the body have been prominent in critical theory 
and feminist theory for decades and, of course, in the terms of the mind-body 
problem for centuries. For some schools of thought, there would be no need 
to develop a definition beyond that provided by common usage: to make 
corporeal or incorporate (as in, to include in a body). For some, as we have 
seen, the solution to the mind-body problem is no more nor less than to 
incorporate the mind. 
For my part, the need to define embodiment emerges alongside the 
considerations of critical psychologists and feminist theorists who continue to 
interrogate the received ‘truths’ about being human inside a human body. In 
summarising the writings of Rosi Braidotti, Elisabeth Grosz and Moira 
Gatens, among others, Kathy Davis (1997) points out that theorising about the 
body is all too often a ‘disembodied activity’ much in need of an account of 
individuals’ (including the theorist’s own) embodied experiences: 
 
Understanding what embodiment means to individuals depends 
upon being able to sort out how sexual, ‘racial’ and other 
differences intersect and give meaning to their interactions with 
their bodies and through their bodies with the world around them. 
Conditions of embodiment are organized by systemic patterns of 
domination and subordination, making it impossible to grasp 
individual body practices, body regimes and discourses about the 
body without taking power into account. By assuming that the 
theorist is also embodied, feminist theory opens up possibilities 
for exploring new ways of doing theory. (1997: 14) 
 
I will argue in what follows that critical psychological theorising about the 
mind and the body must recognise (or indeed proceed from) an account of the 
relationship between theorising mind and body and being embodied. The 
argument hinges on a further series of polytextual readings of texts that 
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discuss phenomena, such as phantom limbs, which render problematical the 
intuitive understanding we have of our minds and bodies.  
A recent episode of another popular science series, Mystery of the Senses 
(Lifestyle Channel, Foxtel, 21 March 1999), discussed the degree to which 
the brain was the extra-sensory source of what we otherwise sense as reality. 
Referring to phantom limbs, the presenter explained that perceptions of 
reality do not devolve from the physicality of the outside world (through the 
senses) but come from ‘within here’ (he was pointing to his head). For the 
presenter, this ‘here’ referred to the brain, to which he added that electrical 
stimulations by electrodes on the surface of the brain are not registered by the 
subject as sensations on or in the brain but elsewhere on the body (as an itch 
on the nose, or a twitch in a finger, for example). The implication is that our 
sensory relation to the external world is determined by electrical activity in 
the brain rather than by what is given from without - in any case, we find that 
the question of our status in the world is only for the physical sciences to 
address. 
The claims made in this program may simplify the case, but they do seem 
to reflect the prevailing views of many scientific researchers into phantom 
limb phenomena at least until the last decade of the twentieth-century. Peter 
Lloyd stated that among the different approaches to the mind-body problem, 
physicalism, the view ‘that the mind is really a physical phenomenon going 
on inside the brain,’ was the prevailing view (1993: 17). In terms that are 
similar to those expressed in Mystery of the Senses, Lloyd first presents a case 
for physicalism based on some simple ‘tricks’: damage to nerve fibres may 
cause the brain to construe pain in the area of the body where the incoming 
nerves are rooted, unaware that these signals originate somewhere along the 
damaged fibres en route; the phantom limb sensations of amputees clearly do 
not originate in the missing limb itself; and electrical stimulation of an 
incoming nerve will cause the brain to project sensation onto that part of the 
body from which that nerve impulse should have originated (18). The 
conclusion to be drawn from these ‘tricks’ is straightforward enough: ‘What 
this shows us is that the mind is not really dispersed throughout the body but 
is centralised in the brain. The brain constructs an illusory distribution of 
mental sensations over the body’ (18). 
Lloyd’s simplistic presentation of the physicalist approach may echo the 
presenter who points to his head to designate the origin of sensory 
perceptions, yet his purpose is quite different. He also presents detailed 
evidence of ‘actual experiments on living brains’ to examine the physical 
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correlates of the conscious mind and finally to dismantle identity theory 
which posits a one-to-one relationship between locations on the brain and 
mental phenomena. Lloyd’s strategy is effective: the more straightforward the 
physicalist argument seems to be, the more compelling becomes the concrete 
evidence of actual experimentation in arguing against these ideas. Of course, 
Lloyd does not reject all the tenets of physicalism, only the push toward 
localisation in identity theory. The point is to demonstrate that the mind and 
the brain are not identical, but to also show that there is a more direct 
relationship between the mind and the brain than between the mind and the 
rest of the body. 
Such claims prompt the following question: how are we to distinguish 
between the brain and the rest of the body? For neurology, in particular, the 
question has unnerving - I use the term deliberately - consequences. At what 
point do we consider that the networks of nerve fibres, which extend 
throughout the body, can be distinguished from the brain or the body in our 
understanding of their functions? If the nervous system is understood as a 
function of the way in which brain processes control and respond to bodily 
stimuli, is it possible to think of a ‘body’ that is not already contained by our 
thinking about brain processes? Significantly, one of the effects of asking 
these questions - the explanatory adequacy of which can be measured in the 
degree to which brain and body are defined in their interrelationships - is that 
the imperative to consider the mind seems to fall by the wayside. 
Wilson (1998) provides a comprehensive account of how an account of the 
human psyche can be restored to the agenda of neurological science, by 
deconstructing the dilemma of mind and body, neurology and psychology, 
which, as we have seen, can be attributed to Freud’s ‘Project for a Scientific 
Psychology’ from over a century ago. The advantage of the Freudian model, 
particularly via the deconstructive approach Wilson takes into consideration, 
is that its defining characteristic is not the location of neurons but the 
relations between them. Thus, the key to understanding the relation of mind 
to body is not in locating the mind but in coming to terms with the forces that 
animate biological matter on the path to cognition. The neurological science 
to which Wilson adheres is connectionism, a group of relatively new theories 
of cognition based on models ‘sometimes referred to as neural networks or 
parallel distributed processing (PDP) models,’ since these theories privilege 
the connections between units in attempts to understand cognitive functioning 
(Wilson 1998: 5-6). 
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My interest is in Wilson’s synthesis of deconstructive and 
psychoanalytical modes of analysis together with the neurological science 
from which Freud took his initial steps on the royal road to the unconscious. 
Returning to phantom limb phenomena, I think this synthesis can be 
mobilised within the much older tradition of conceptualising mind and body 
as an embodied practice. At the very foundation of dualism, for example, the 
phantom played a crucial role, since it was with the example of the phantom 
limb that Descartes attempted to divorce the mind from the brain by linking 
the former with the entire body rather than one of its higher organs. 
Nevertheless, as Elizabeth Grosz states, Descartes’s psychophysical dualism 
situates the interaction of mind and body in the brain, as it is in this organ that 
‘movements’ resulting from peripheral stimulations are centred (1994: 63). 
Descartes thus clings to the brain as the primary surface upon which the mind 
and body interact. It is as though the founder of dualism wanted to render 
problematical the relation of mind and body based on the example of 
accounts of non-physical phenomena (phantom limbs), but found that if he 
reasoned empirically the phenomena only make sense by recourse to 
explanations in terms of the physical effects of non-physical phenomena and 
the degree to which these effects are located (perhaps, originally) in the brain. 
Yet even at the foundation of the dualism of mind and body, Descartes 
problematises this distinction in a way that can be understood if we read the 
Cartesian text as a text. In Descartes, as Gary Shapiro has argued (after Jean-
Luc Nancy), the program of anatomising mental phenomena is not only 
theorised but actively thematised, such that the discourse itself can be seen to 
constitute the corporeality of the represented body: 
 
‘While I am writing,’ writes Descartes in his Rules for the 
Direction of the Mind, as he implicates an entire apparatus and 
instrumentality by which he realizes himself as the one whose 
thoughts are embodied by being written and being read. In ‘Dum 
Scribo’ Nancy traces how far Descartes (who perhaps should not 
be called a Cartesian here) ‘mind and body take form together - in 
writing which is imprinted.’ Descartes’s word for body, of course, 
is corpus. Descartes can be reread and rewritten in his 
corporeality, as a thinker who fantasized his body as a pen and for 
whom the prosthetic language in which he describes his bodily 
activity is not a mere metaphor. (1994: 61) 
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Beyond empiricism, then, Descartes performs the textuality of the body by 
inscribing in and through the written word the corporeality of the text 
(corpus). Even at the inception of dualism, the performativity of the critical 
text thus hints at a corporeality that inheres in something other than flesh and 
bone. Descartes’s ‘prosthetic language’ is not simply a metaphor precisely 
because it presents a written text as an extension of the corporeal, whereby 
inscription equals embodiment. In other words, Descartes’s text is also his 
own phantom limb. 
This equation of body and text, of embodiment and inscription, also 
emerges inevitably from clinical studies into phantom limb phenomena. 
During the last decade, the most prolific experimenter and theorist of 
phantom limbs has been Vilayanur Ramachandran, whose recent Phantoms in 
the Brain (with Sandra Blakeslee 1998) contains accounts of much of this 
past research. Ramachandran has collected many further examples of the sorts 
of ‘tricks’ to which Peter Lloyd referred in 1993, yet his focus remains on 
clinical applications of these phenomena. Perhaps the most famous of his 
experiments is the use of a mirror in a box to enable amputees to ‘see’ the 
phantom limb—they see a reflection of their surviving limb in the same 
location as the phantom limb. What this enables the patient to do is overcome 
the resilient ‘body image,’ the result of which is that residual pain or paralysis 
associated with the phantom limb dissipates. The key to success in such 
experiments is attributed to the illusory nature of the view we have of 
ourselves, which Ramachandran calls ‘perceptual plasticity’: ‘All our 
perceptions - indeed, maybe all aspects of our minds - are governed by 
comparisons and not by absolute values’ (1998: 167). 
Importantly, this plasticity poses a dilemma from an empirical standpoint, 
since we are unable to determine an objective correlate for the body image 
(an ‘absolute value’) that can be measured and verified scientifically. Yet the 
claim that perceptions, maybe even all aspects of our minds, are governed by 
comparisons is amenable to a deconstructive (or at least a somewhat 
analytical) approach to psychical phenomena. It is no surprise to find that 
Ramachandran describes the brain functions that produce phantom limbs and 
similar phenomena as part of a process akin to Freudian defence mechanisms. 
Rather than develop a composite neurological theory of repression, however, 
Ramachandran’s primary interest remains the clinical possibilities for a 
physiological approach to these phenomena. Indeed, in an earlier paper he 
proposes that a physiological intervention, ‘left ear coloric stimulation, may 
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eventually be used actually to replace psychoanalysis as a device for reviving 
repressed memories and for producing insight’ (1994: 330). 
Responding to Ramachandran’s work on phantom limbs, Gail Weiss 
reiterates the point that the success of these experiments is not a triumph of 
body over body image but ‘the construction of a new morphological 
imaginary, one that offers new sites of projection and identification and new 
bodily possibilities’ (1999: 37). Weiss emphasises the plasticity of the body 
image itself as much as the perceptual faculty through which it is realised. 
The notion of a body image has frequently in the past been used as an index 
of the unity of a blueprint that we possess within ourselves of the whole of 
our bodies. Under the rubric of such terms as ‘schemata,’ ‘homunculus,’ 
‘neuromatrix,’ ‘genego’ (genetic ego) and others, a number of models have 
been developed to account for a map of our bodies to which our brain refers 
in making sense of external stimuli or perceptions.2 For Weiss, 
Ramachandran’s clinical evidence supports the long-standing philosophical 
tradition from Descartes to modern phenomenology, which does not deny the 
materiality of the body but designates the ‘imaginary’ as the overarching 
domain within which the whole of our perceptual life is played out. By 
understanding this domain morphologically, we form a picture of that aspect 
of the body image, governed by comparison, which can be analysed: that is, 
we can begin to analyse the mechanisms, rules and limits to change. 
Summarising various accounts of phantom limb experiences, Grosz notes 
that the phantom is not really an image or recollection of the absent limb, 
since it is often distorted (1994: 71). Such distortions - the phantom may be 
lighter, more sluggish, or larger or smaller than the missing limb - are only 
measurable as distortions by referring in the past to properties and 
dimensions of the missing limb. Thus, distortion expresses a ‘nostalgia for the 
unity and wholeness of the body, its completion’ (73). The phantom 
experience is ‘a memorial to the missing limb, a psychical delegate that 
stands in its place …. the narcissistic reassertion of the limb’s presence in the 
face of its manifest biological loss, an attempt to preserve the subject’s 
narcissistic sense of bodily wholeness’ (73). Phantom limbs manifest or 
intensify, after partial loss, a narcissistic function of embodiment: the degree 
to which our body image exceeds the container of the flesh, or to which 
‘reality’ merely extends corporeality via the body-text or corpus. 
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Perhaps the relationship between the corporeal and the textual, when 
referring to body image theorising, is still difficult to express in such concrete 
terms as these. Yet we may need to look no further than the testimonies 
supplied as clinical evidence by the subjects of the experiments that we have 
been describing, to find a compelling expression of the relationship I am 
attempting to elaborate. Invariably, under experimental conditions or in tests 
relating to phantom limb phenomena, the principal determinant for the 
presence and behaviour of the phantom is the verbal report given by the test 
subject. Certainly, observers cannot determine the presence of the phantom in 
the same way other intact organs or limbs can be observed, measured, probed, 
or scanned in their (scientifically) detached entirety. The phantom thus 
represents an excess, for it exceeds the observable boundary (the skin) by 
which the body appears to be limited, and its reality can not be ascertained 
with reference to this boundary. The appropriate phrase for referring to the 
phantom is nothing like ‘take my hand’ or ‘how many fingers do you see;’ 
instead, it is only with ‘take my word for it’ that the individual who possesses 
a phantom can bear witness to its presence and to the quality of the sensations 
or movements the phantom registers. 
The reliance by those testing for the (absent) presence of phantom limbs 
on individual testimonies is worth noting here because it suggests that 
accounts of phantom limbs are not merely diagnostic (‘tell me if this hurts’ 
and such like) but core features of reality testing in the actualisation of a 
phantom for both the subject and the observer. Thus, we may presume that in 
normative functioning of the body image, our sense of our own corporeality 
as well as that of others is inextricably linked to a mode of representation. 
Weiss refers to embodiment in these terms as ‘intercorporeality,’ inasmuch as 
every body image is always an image of a particular body, ‘a body that is 
different from all others and that is lived in idiosyncratic ways,’ yet which is 
negotiated and changing since it occurs ‘among body images, body image 
ideals … and the cultural imaginary that actively supports them’ (1999: 66). 
The discursive practices by which we theorise the body image does not take 
place independently from these processes, for they contribute to the 
establishment of particular ways of thinking about the body. 
One implication of the studies into phantom limb phenomena is that the 
way in which we assume our selves to be embodied in toto is contingent upon 
a textualised body image that only coincides through expression with the 
physical surface of our bodies. What remains to be shown here is how 
theorisations of mind and body may access the morphological imaginary 
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governing this coincidence. My suggestion is that we might usefully discuss 
this possibility by considering how issues of embodiment relate to a 
psychoanalytical understanding of mind and body. Consideration of 
psychoanalytical uses of the terms “psyche” and “soma” will allow us a 
chance to glimpse (if only awry, in a sense) the unconscious source of 
embodiment, by thinking of a textualised body image that is at once 
concurrent with consciousness and the outer surface or limit that the 
unconscious imposes upon itself precisely so that it will be closed off from 
external phenomena and from consciousness. 
My use of the term psychosomatic will not be diagnostic, in the sense that 
a physician may classify a particular physical condition as psychosomatic 
where a psychical source for physical symptoms may be assumed in the 
absence of any apparent physical source. Julia Kristeva has concisely stated 
that a ‘psychosomatic condition’ - just like wounded ‘narcissisms,’ ‘false 
personalities,’ or ‘borderline states’ - derives from ‘the inability to represent’ 
(1995: 9). As a psychoanalyst herself, Kristeva may seem justified in 
reclaiming the category of the psychosomatic from the field of medicine 
which has taken the term for its name.3 Yet this focus on the ‘inability to 
represent’ is a response to the pressures upon psychoanalysis that Kristeva 
sees as having accompanied the ‘recent advances in neurobiology and 
pharmacology’ (1995: 30). By this I mean that Kristeva’s theorisation of the 
psychosomatic condition contributes to her push for psychoanalysis to 
develop broader relevance, beginning with a reconsideration of the concept of 
the drive as a response to new brain technologies.  The drive, in Kristeva’s 
terms, ‘is a pivot between “soma” and “psyche,” between biology and 
representation - the highest level of organization and permanency to which 
Freudian listening and theory can aspire’ with ‘biology’ defined by Kristeva 
as ‘drives and energy, if you wish, but always already a “carrier of meaning” 
and a “relation” to another person, even though this person may be yourself’ 
(1995: 30). 
When Kristeva describes the psychosomatic condition as an inability to 
represent, then, she is responding to the diagnostic practices of analysts and 
physicians for whom bodies are merely biological entities with which things 
commonly go wrong. I understand that for most people the term 
‘psychosomatic’ means (at best) a non-existent complaint that is simply 
imagined, or (at worst) madness. No longer does the expression ‘in the head’ 
cover the terrain of the psychosomatic in the popular imagination now that 
science has told us that it is only the brain (qua the mind) that we find if we 
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look inside our heads. Kristeva reminds us, however, that a diagnosis of a 
psychosomatic condition is to both ‘psyche’ and ‘soma’ what a diagnosis of a 
heart condition is to a normally functioning heart. The normative status of the 
psychosomatic is precisely the opposite of its status in diagnostics - if the 
psychosomatic ‘condition’ is understood as an inability to represent then the 
normative function of the relationship between psyche and soma must be the 
very condition of representation itself. This claim responds to the problems 
perceived by Kristeva by invoking the drive’s pivotal role between biology 
and representation. 
Yet the lesson of critical polytextualism now comes clearly to the fore: it is 
simply not sufficient for our purposes here to arrive at the conclusion that the 
relationship between psyche and soma constitutes the condition of 
representation, if we arrive at this point by way of negating a diagnostic 
discourse. Why, then, should we privilege the Freudian drive or the 
psychoanalytic understanding of the psychosomatic over those bodies of texts 
to which Kristeva responds?  The point to be made is that Kristeva recognises 
that the drive is ‘always already’ a ‘carrier of meaning’ even if it is 
understood biologically, in terms of the carriage of energy. To be understood 
psychoanalytically - in terms of that which is radically unavailable to 
conscious reason - the terms ‘psyche’ and ‘soma’ have been subjected to what 
Nicolas Abraham (1994) has called ‘designification.’ 
For Abraham, the terms used in psychoanalysis do not acquire new 
meanings, because ‘they do not strictly speaking signify anything, except the 
founding silence of any act of signification’ (1994: 84). This is to say that 
psychoanalysis strips words of what they may signify to conscious reasoning, 
thereby addressing (although, by definition, never expressing) the 
unconscious source of representations. ‘Psyche’ and ‘Soma’ pass into 
psychoanalytical understanding by being stripped of the meanings attributed 
them by ‘naive empiricism’ or phenomenology: 
 
The somatic must be something quite different from the body 
proper, which derives from the psychic as one of its functions, the 
psychic having been described by Freud as an exterior layer, an 
envelope. The somatic is what I cannot touch directly, either as 
my integument and its internal prolongations or as my psyche, the 
latter given to the consciousness of self; the somatic is that of 
which I would know nothing if its representative, my fantasy, 
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were not there to send me back to it, its source as it were. 
(Abraham 1994: 87) 
 
Abraham notes that one term exempted from designification is the term for 
what passes between psyche and soma in their interrelation: ‘only the 
representative, the mediator between the two poles x, seems to have 
preserved its meaning, inasmuch as it is a term known by comparison with a 
known relation of mediation’ (86). 
What is inherent in the relation of the psychic to the somatic is therefore 
nothing more nor less than the very fact of this relation, as it inheres in a 
representation of the somatic in the psychic and the psychic in the somatic. 
By designifying the term ‘psychosomatic’ via the form of the term ‘Psycho-
Somatic,’ Freud’s anti-semantic discourse identifies the representative 
(Kristeva’s ‘carrier’) as that which is ‘always already’ anterior to meaning. 
The ‘meaning’ may vary - a memory trace, a body image, a partial object, a 
compulsion  … in short, the psychical ‘reality’ - but the fact of the 
representative remains constant. We now begin to arrive at an understanding 
of the everyday psychical necessity of embodiment. If the carrier is constant, 
then there would seem to be no end to its carriage. This seeming endlessness 
is just the character that Freud ascribed to the drives, for which the goal is 
never so important as the getting-there - philosophically, this is called desire; 
in biological terms, this represents ‘energy’ animating flesh. Of course, the 
drive is necessarily driven-toward, for which purpose a goal is inscribed in 
the principle of getting-there - representation presupposes its object, which 
the drive posits irreducibly as an exteriority to itself. As a result, the principle 
of an exterior limit to the drive is included in its very movement. For 
Abraham, this limit is manifested in the first instance in the formation of an 
interior-exterior layer - the two directions toward which the limit extends - of 
the psychical enclave of the unconscious. The relations between the somatic 
and the psychic are embedded upon this nucleus, in a series of peripheries, of 
which the outermost formation (or envelope) is the ego. 
We should not forget, of course, that for Freud the ego which envelops the 
psychical apparatus is ‘first and foremost, a bodily [körperliches] ego; it is 
not merely a surface entity [Oberflächenwesen], but is itself the projection of 
a surface’ (in Anzieu 1989: 85). While the somatic is not understood 
psychoanalytically as the body proper, we do find that in the ego the surface 
of a body is represented as the exterior limit of the psychical. Embodiment as 
I have been describing it in this essay is the realisation of the Freudian ego, 
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which we now understand to be the outermost layer posited by the 
unconscious. Importantly, this process is at once bodily and psychical, with 
the drive creating the very need for layers to be posited equally capable of 
being understood as both desire (philosophically) and energy 
(physiologically). 
I also want to emphasise that for Abraham the formation of the ego - this 
projection of the bodily surface at the limits of the psyche - is the same 
process as acquisition of the metaphorics of word-formation. Reviving 
Sandor Ferenczi’s definition of introjection as the ‘process of broadening the 
ego,’ Abraham and Maria Torok (1994) explain that in libidinal attachment 
the child confronts its own inability to internalise the exteriorised object 
through the mouth, for which it compensates by filling the mouth with word 
sounds. Word-formation is thus inseparable from embodiment, each 
constituting one side of the formation of the ego. To conclude, then, the 
corpus of psychoanalysis locates the terms with which we might represent 
embodiment as the same process in which realities are constituted in words 
and thoughts - as representations. For psychoanalysis, the shaping of the ego 
takes place in the process by which the subject first acquires words in forming 
a metaphorical relation with the outside world.  Conscious reason is carried 
out within this relation, and it is therefore coterminous with the projected 
surface that the interior posits as its outer limit. 
I suggest that the disciplinary boundaries or fields of discourse that 
generate the sense of propriety that I discussed at the beginning of this paper 
are products of this drive toward an exteriorised limit. As we have seen, this 
is the same as saying that disciplinary limits are in some sense a function of 
the process of embodiment. Interrogations of the mind-body relation take 
place within discourse, and are therefore embodied practices in their own 
right. Yet interrogations of the other side of representation risk getting under 
the skin of the text, as it were, and forcing us to abandon the critical corpus or 
body of texts (that is, the polytext) marking out the surface upon which our 
discourse inscribes itself and those of us who speculate within this domain. 
What is at stake is not simply the opening out of the boundaries of one 
discipline in response to a challenge presented by another; rather, it is the 
radical abandonment of all boundaries that have traditionally separated one 
discipline from another, one corpus from another, or one body of ideas from 
another. If we find that we are still protective of this body of ideas, it may 
only be because we are still too attached to the idea of the body. 
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This essay expands upon a paper presented at the Millennium World 
Conference in Critical Psychology at the University of Western Sydney, 
Nepean, on 1 May 1999. 
 
Notes 
 
1. See, for example, Galen Strawson, ‘The Experiential and the Non-experiential,’ 
(69-86); Steven J. Wagner, ‘Supervenience, Recognition, and Consciousness,’ (87-
98); and Colin McGinn, ‘Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?’ (99-120); and the 
editors’ summaries of these essays (3-5). 
2. For discussion of these terms see, for example, the following: on Frederic 
Bartlett’s ‘schemata’ see Wilson (1998, 171-77); on the traditional ‘homunculus’ see 
Damasio (1996); on ‘neuromatrix’ see Melzack (1993); and on the ‘genego’ see 
Hearne (1999). 
3. On the history of psychosomatic medicine, see Graeme Taylor (1987, 1-38). 
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